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Saving the Horn of Africa from its elites: What prospects 
for the future of peace in the region1 
 
 
Fantu Cheru2 
 
 
I want to thank the organizers of this ‘Africa Day’ event for inviting me to 
deliver this Keynote Address at this very important gathering. It would be a bit 
presumptuous to call my talk a keynote because as I speak to you right now, 
diverse actors on the ground in the Horn of Africa are rewriting the political map 
of the region in dramatic fashion. The political dynamics in the Horn at this 
particular minute will look very different when I am done with my lecture 30 
minutes from now.  
 
I accepted the invitation with great hesitation, just to be frank with you. Coming 
to a gathering to discuss the treacherous, depressing and senseless politics of the 
‘Horn of Africa’ is just like blindly stepping into a ‘slaughter house’’ through I 
must admit, that the people I see in front of me don’t look like threatening 
monsters. 
 
For many years, I have avoided to go to any gathering that has to do with the 
Horn of Africa. I have long concluded that any workshop or conference on the 
‘Horn of Africa’ simply amounts to a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. We are prepared to 
keep killing each other; we are prepared to sacrifice the lives of millions of our 
innocent citizens not because we disagree over some noble ideas such as 
democracy and self-determination or even a clearer ideology--- these conflicts 
are essentially all about elite-elite struggles for power for constructing their own 
version of new patronage system—though these conflicts are often framed in the 
language of self-determination or democracy and human rights, etc. 
 
I came here today not to deliver one of those ‘feel good’ lectures about the 
conditions in the Horn of Africa. Rather, I came to deliver the bad news. The 
Horn of Africa continues to suffer conflict, human rights abuses, and political 
instability. The aspirations of the long-suffering citizens of the region for 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at the Horn of Africa Workshop: What is the Way out: 
Challenges in Overcoming Governance Crises, Endemic Conflicts and Negative External 
Involvements in the Horn of Africa? The workshop took place May 26, 2008 at Aalborg 
University and was hosted by Development, Innovation and International Political 
Economy Research (DIIPER) in Collaboration with Centre for Comparative Integration 
Studies (CCIS), Aalborg University. 
2  The author holds a PhD and is Research Director at the North Africa Institute, Uppsala, 
Sweden. 
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democracy, human rights and human security continue to be frustrated. What 
are the objective conditions on the ground that sustains this crisis of mindless 
proportions? 
 
--The Horn of Africa is undergoing radical structural changes, with serious 
economic, political and social consequences (even if some of this might turn out 
to be positive). 
 
• A considerable number of countries in the Horn of Africa are facing new 
crisis and conflicts. Unfinished wars (Somalia, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Darfur, etc.) 
The problems appear intractable. Where progress has been made, it has 
become fragile.  
• Consolidating democracy and good governance remain elusive 
• Different tendencies in state formation—from federalism in Ethiopia to state 
collapse in Somalia; authoritarian tendencies in Eritrea and Ethiopia; Sharia 
rule in Sudan and Somalia; incipient democratic autonomy in South Sudan as 
a result of the peace dividend. 
 
What are the other contradictory tendencies in the region? 
 
• On the one hand, all the countries in the region with the exception of Eritrea 
and Somalia—i.e. Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda—are experiencing 
positive economic growth. 
• On the other hand, Arab politics has penetrated the region in many ways and 
complicating political dynamics in the region. This manifests itself in several 
ways: (Eritrea, Somalia and specially Djibouti are getting pulled). 
• The spread of terrorism is likely to be there for the foreseeable future. 
Muslims in Ethiopia constitute the largest segment of the population in the 
region—more than the total Muslim population of Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea 
and Djibouti combined. 
• Fundamentalism is penetrating the Muslim population of Ethiopia, 
presenting the state with a major security challenge. This will continue to 
have a major influence on Ethiopia’s public expenditure priorities. 
• Mobility of people has dramatically increased—from Hargessa in Somalia to 
North Sudan, millions of people are on the move. Guns, drugs, crime 
syndicates, terrorist and extremists move across porous borders easily in a 
region where state capacity has been very weak. 
• Djibouti has increasingly aligning itself with the Gulf politics and less and 
less with IGAD. After the sale of its port to the Dubai Port Authority, the 
government has literally turned its back on Africa and sees itself as part of the 
Gulf. This creates greater tension between lands locked Ethiopia and Djibouti. 
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With all these difficult and complicated political shifts, the region is at a 
crossroad. Who is winning? Who is losing out? No one knows! The balance of 
power is shifting radically, with severe implications to the countries of the 
region and to other external powers. In this influx and shifting political 
environment, Ethiopia is playing a major role by default. This fact represents a 
strategic challenge to the West on how to engage the Ethiopian state. While 
questions are raised in the west about the authoritarian tendencies of the 
Ethiopian regime, attempt to punish the regime through sanctions or isolation is 
more likely to destabilize the region further than to advance the peace and 
security agenda. 
 
The overall political condition in the region does not impart durable solutions to 
the conflicts and the building of a potent sub-regional architecture for peace and 
security is virtually nonexistent. The obstacles to peace and security in the Horn 
include: (1) the lack of internal peace in most countries, (2) the fact that internal 
conflicts are rarely contained within the borders of one country, (3) the absence 
of a stable and consensual regional power order, (4) the disputed legitimacy of 
states and governments and the inability of democratic processes to provide that 
legitimacy, (5) dependency on foreign financiers and especially the U.S., and (6) 
the lack of autonomy of the key multilateral intuitions, such as IGAD and AU. 
 
 
The Horn Today 
Let me start with a review of the state of affairs in the region. 
 
Somalia  
--Somalia has been the site of continuous rounds of crisis since the 1970s, when 
the 1974 drought followed by the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia began a 
long period of internal displacement, refugee flows, and deteriorating food 
security in the country. The state of complete collapse of central government in 
Somalia since 1991 has compounded these problems. Somalia’s serial crisis 
over the past thirty years has, in turn, created considerable hardships for its 
neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of Somali refuges have fled into Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti. Flows of arms from Somalia have militarized 
communal conflicts across the eastern Horn. Criminal violence and lawlessness 
have intermittently swept parts of Eastern Africa.  
 
Somalia has eluded all aspects to find a political settlement and is once again in 
a state of turmoil that threatens the security of its neighbors. Broadly speaking, 
warlordism, the question of Somaliland, Political Islam and the occupation and 
hegemonic control of land and resources in the deep south of the country have 
been the main obstacles of peace and reconciliation since the collapse of 
government in 1991.  
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Of course, understanding the Somali crisis requires more than the casual 
familiarity with conflict among Somali clans. Clans do not generate conflict; 
rather it is the politicization of clanism by opportunistic elites that create 
conflict. 
 
Beginning with the Islamist takeover of Mogadishu in 2006 and the subsequent 
Ethio-American invasion, Somalia has reverted to a familiar pattern of parochial 
competition for power and resources. The identification of the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) leadership as a narrow political and clan coalition, 
rather than an inclusive government of national unity, has left many Somalis 
feeling disenfranchised by the transitional process. The Council of Somali 
Islamic Courts (CSIC)’s primary clan constituencies remain largely hostile to 
the TFG and, like many other Somalis, resent the presence of foreign troops on 
Somali soil. 
 
The Ethiopian regime wants its troops to be replaced by an AU force. However, 
other African countries have been reluctant to contribute to such a force, initially 
to exceed eight battalions. Even if this is to happen, the AU troops will be seen 
as propping up the TFG. Opposition forces will consider them to be hostile, 
legitimate targets. 
 
Since the collapse of the CSIC, kinship has once again asserted itself as defining 
characteristics of Somali politics, and opposition to the TFG is, for the time 
being, anchored primarily in clan rather than ideology. Broadly speaking, this 
involves a Darod-dominated TFG and a Hawiye-based opposition, although the 
situation is far more complex. The common perception is the TFG’s federal 
agenda is designed to maximize Darod clan interests. 
 
Regardless of clan affiliation, many Somalis were shocked and angered by 
Ethiopian and American military intervention in Somalia, and remain deeply 
opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Somali soil. These sentiments 
translate into opposition to the TFG, which they hold partly responsible for this 
situation. 
 
Widespread social and political opposition to the TFG has rendered much of 
southern Somalia unstable, and provides space in which various armed 
opposition groups, including some with links to terrorism, continue to operate. 
Instability and violence in Somalia will likely persist until the TFG takes urgent 
steps towards political reconciliation.  Unfortunately, the TFG seems to perceive 
political reconciliation in terms of persuasion and cooptation. It has not 
demonstrated its willingness to engage in real ‘social reconciliation’ involving 
power sharing arrangement that addresses the underlying causes of conflict. 
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In short, Somalia is likely to remain a source of refugee flows, small arms flows, 
illicit cross-border economic activities, and possibly terrorist activity for some 
years to come. And due to counter-terrorism patrols, Somalia’s border areas are 
now heavily militarized, creating less permissive conditions for humanitarian 
missions there.  Refugees are now under close scrutiny as neighboring states 
seek to prevent radical Islamists from gaining entry into their territory. 
 
 
Eritrea 
Coming into independence after a long and bitter liberation struggle, Eritrea’s 
existence as an independent state has been deeply affected by the attitudes, 
which this experience entrenched in the mentalities of its leadership. Eritrea’s 
catastrophic engagement in war with Ethiopia, which at a stroke destroyed the 
prospects for what had until then appeared to be quite a promising start to its 
independence existence, affected its relations with its other neighbors. 
 
One common element was the new state’s acute sensitivity to its territoriality, 
which extended to a brief military flare-up with Djibouti, and to the occupation 
of the Nanish islands in the southern Red Sea whose possession it contested with 
Yemen. Neither of these disputed assumed anything like the intensity of that 
with Ethiopia. The dispute with its neighbors helped to establish Eritrea’s 
reputation in the region as a bad neighbor. Eritrea has become a persistent 
destabilizing force in the region, hosting various armed opposition groups. 
While one cannot rule out a return to war with Ethiopia, insiders point out an 
eminent political collapse in Eritrea, which could end up sending millions of 
refugees to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan.  
 
To make matters worse, Eritrea’s economy is slowly grinding to a halt. 
Remittances keep whatever left of the economy (about 34% of GDP). The 
private sector has collapsed; there are no jobs and no spare land. For now it 
make sense to keep young people occupied in the military if only for fear that 
the social consequences of releasing them could be much worse than the 
economic problems caused by mobilization. At the end of open hostilities with 
Ethiopia in mid-2000, some 300,000 young men and women were mobilized. As 
of last year, barely 100,000-armed combatants have been demobilized. 
 
On the other hand, the international community has embraced Ethiopia—despite 
its bad human rights record, whereas Eritrea has been locked into a downward 
spiral of intensifying isolation and resentment. 
 
For the time being, Eritrea and is unfortunate people remain in the impasse 
created by their own government, a situation that is likely to continue until the 
sudden release of built-up tensions or the providential demise of is present 
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leader. Eritrean citizens themselves can only undertake any solution to the 
political deadlock in Eritrea. Attempt to impose a government from outside 
could only be counter-productive. Until then, the regional and global community 
can only sit and wait, while taking every precaution to insulate the rest of the 
region from Eritrea’s problem. 
 
 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict 
The border dispute between the two countries has a consequential and close link 
to the prevailing lack of peace and security in the Horn. This is not the place to 
go into the tangled and extremely depressing history of the conflict up to the 
present time. The dispute is essentially political and ‘egotistical’ and not 
exclusively territorial or legal; therefore, it could not be resolved solely through 
the instrumentality of international law. 
 
Ethiopia has achieved regional hegemony and has been able to garner the 
support of major actors outside of the region. This is resented by Eritrea and 
Somalia. They perceive Ethiopia’s hegemony as intimidating and have found 
radical Islam as a unifying factor to oppose Ethiopia’s hegemonic position. 
 
 
Sudan 
Sudan appears to be at a critical juncture poised between the threat of 
disintegration, and the promise of genuine unity within a restructured national 
framework. It is a country situated at the confluence of Arab and Africa cultures, 
and the whole Africa integration project hinges on the success of Sudan. 
 
One of the most significant developments, that affected Sudan during the last 
three decades, has been the progressive fragmentation of Sudanese politics into 
northern and southern divides. The turmoil in the South, Darfur, the Nubian 
Mountains, had been the most obvious manifestation of this trend. 
 
While the immediate spark of the current political crisis is Darfur and the stalled 
efforts to resolve the conflict there, the repercussions have far-reaching impacts 
on the entire country. It is unhelpful to simplify the conflict in Darfur as one 
between ethnic groups—Arabs against Africans--; rather than a competition 
over scare resources to sustain the livelihoods of pastoralists (mainly but not 
only Arabs) and farmers (mainly African groups of various ethnicities).  The 
conflict is also about power and control, both in Darfur itself and the central 
government in Khartoum. Unlike the conflict between the North and the South 
of Sudan, religion has not been a factor in the conflict in Darfur, the 
predominant faith being Islam among Africans and Arabs. Intermarriages have 
been commonplace. Together with the lack of fertile land and water (perpetuated 
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by desertification) we also find power, influence and distribution of resources as 
the pivotal issues that are related both to the causes of the conflict and the 
solution to it. 
 
The Darfur Peace Agreement included a stronger provision for a cease-fire than 
the previous agreement brokered by Chad in 2004. Only one of the SLA faction, 
the one led by Minni Minawi, signed DPA. SLA/Wahid and JEM/Ibrahim 
considered the agreement to be rushed and premature, lacing in power and 
wealth sharing. Their central demands concerned the level of compensation for 
victims, the disarmament of Janjaweed, the regional status of Darfur and the 
representation of Darfurians in the national government. 
 
Since the Darfur agreement was concluded in May 2006, the rebel movements 
have split into new factions as well as new alliances. Divisions are also 
developing between Darfurians living outside and the military commanders on 
the ground. This further complicates the problem. Civilians are now more 
exposed to armed banditry, and humanitarian workers are hampered by 
increased insecurity. Even the African Union Mission has not been spared from 
rebel attack as well as from the Janjaweed. 
 
While the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) has virtually stalled (some rebel 
groups refuse to sign in), implementation of the CPA is limping. The process of 
democratization and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement are in serious jeopardy. Indeed, reactions to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and attitudes towards it varied widely. Critics charge that the 
agreement has been badly formulated and its implementation has been even 
worse. Parties to the CPA are backtracking from their commitments. The 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission has not become functional so does the 
Joint Defence Core. Border demarcation also remained a thorny issue. The 
situation has deteriorated since the death of John Garang. (Mention the 4 
pillars). The other independent commissions—federal constitutional 
commission; Electoral Commission; Disarmament and Demobilization 
Commission; and Reconciliation Commission—are very important 
instruments, but a strong international commitment to support them is needed if 
the transitional tasks are to be fulfilled. 
 
The solution to the conflict in Darfur is dependent on several different and 
interlocked conditions. First, a solution needs to be seen from a national context, 
where the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the peace agreement for the 
East should be mutually linked and reinforced. In this respect, the successful 
implementation of the CPA is central to all. In this context, the elections 
scheduled for 2009 could prove both a unifying and dividing factor, unless 
prepared in a transparent manner. 
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Secondly, the unstable political situation in Chad, with over 70 political parties 
and a host of rebel movements, must be stabilized. Third, it is crucial that all 
parties see a political solution as the only way out of the crisis. The rebel 
movements and leaders need uniting around a common political platform. 
Fourth, the underlying development causes of the conflict must be tackled. The 
longer it takes to agree on peace, the more the political demands and 
opportunities might shift and further complicate the conflict. 
 
Are there any good news coming out of the Horn? 
 
Depressing, as things seem on the surface, there are also some interesting 
developments in the Horn of Africa. 
 
• First, citizens’ aspirations for peace, security and good governance are higher 
than in the past, and those concerns are expressed through an expanded 
network of international organizations and civil society organizations. 
• On the other hand, there are also dangerous currents blowing in the region 
when it comes to state-society relations. While civil society in Sudan and 
Ethiopia in particular has become more active, the political space for these 
organizations to operate is severely being restricted. The political, 
administrative and legal policy framework that is conducive to the growth of 
a strong, dynamic civil society is inadequate in Sudan and Ethiopia, and no 
space at all in Eritrea. While Ethiopia is currently considering a new NGO 
law, the Government of National Unity in Sudan has passed a new NGO law 
that is having serious implications to the operational freedom of NGOs. This 
law of Organizations of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act avails 
excessive discretionary power to the executive and deprives affected NGOs 
by the law to seek judicial remedy. Freedom of association, and especially 
the right to establish and operate a CSO, appears to be a privilege rather than 
a right that is guaranteed by constitution and international law. 
• International response:  donor commitment to post-conflict crisis in the 
Horn has significantly increased. This included a near doubling of assistance 
to Southern Sudan in 2005, following the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, with large shares of humanitarian and recovery support, 
alongside an increase in development assistance.  
• The OECD-DAC has reached a broad consensus and established a set of 
principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. Several 
bilateral agencies are using these principles to guide their policies and aid 
allocations.  The World Bank and the UN have developed operational 
guidelines for their staff in their joint effort to harmonize and align their 
interventions in their response to countries going through post-conflict or 
political transition, particularly in mobilizing and working with civil society 
organizations. This is particularly important in Sudan, where the service 
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delivery capacity of state institutions is minimal and enabling environment 
deteriorated.  In view of this, a more vibrant civil society has a vital 
development role to play. 
• The Africa Union and IGAD have also been active in peacemaking and 
peacekeeping though limited in their capacity to respond due to lack of 
resources. These sub-regional mechanisms need to be strengthened. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The political conditions for durable solutions to the wars of the Horn and the 
building of a robust sub regional architecture for peace and security have not 
existed and do not appear imminent. What are these preconditions? They include 
the following: 
 
• Credible democratization in the largest states of the region; 
• A resolution to internal conflicts; 
• A stable subregional inter-state order; 
• The existence of autonomous and capable multilateral institutions. 
 
The major responsibility for addressing these political preconditions lies with 
the governments of the subregion. It is their failure to resolve their internal and 
inter-state problems that has allowed the region to become prey to external 
agendas. 
 
 
Minimal requirements for securing peace in the Horn 
 
• Improving security: before any dialogue or reconciliation can begin, an 
environment that enhanced personal safety must in place. This is true for 
Somalia and Darfur. 
• Deliver humanitarian assistance that responds to basic needs, focuses on aid 
on victims and does not undercut local capacity or distort the local economy. 
• Increase governance and peacemaking capacity within key groups to 
strengthen the likelihood of a shorter, more lasting recovery period. 
• Support job creation and school enrolment where possible, but with a special 
focus on undeserved populations and IDPs. 
 
In the early recovery phase: 
 
• On the political front: support transitional justice and transitional 
governance arrangements at all levels; 
• Advance national dialogue and tangible progress toward the country’s future, 
the reconstitution of society, and implications for the future (new 
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constitutions, legal reform, structure of government, symbols of national 
unity),  
• Support the establishment of functional national administration. 
• On the economic front: focus on reviving the economy, with emphasis on 
rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, job creation, market reform, 
establishing tax codes and banking services; 
• Distribute seeds, fertilizers, tools, etc. 
• On the social realm: reintegrate or resettle IDPs, provide protection and care 
for children, reunite families. 
• On the Security front: focus on establishing public security and security 
sector reform. 
• Monitor respect for human rights and support abuse-prevention initiatives. 
 
I feel embarrassed to give you a laundry list of prescriptions, but there is no 
other way to start. The problem is so complex that one has to start from 
somewhere. There are no ready-made solutions to the intractable problems of 
the Horn of Africa.  We borrow a line from a famous African novel by the 
Ghanaian writer Ayke Armah, ‘The beautiful ones are not yet born’ in the Horn 
of Africa. We need a whole new generation of Africans who can lead the people 
of the Horn of Africa to the Promised Land.  
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